According to Augustine (d. 430), we do not learn about the things themselves through words, since if we did not already know what words like green, room and cabinet mean, the word will not teach it to us. However, words do have a function – they prompt us by directing our attention to “remind us to look for things.” (The Teacher, p. 137, l. 170) We have to be prompted, to compare what we have been told, to consult our “inner light” (p. 140, l. 31), that is, God, to make the judgement if what is told is true.
Knowledge for Augustine is knowing what is true and knowing that what we know is true. In an educational setting with a teacher and student, this latter part is an act of judgement made by the student which the teacher cannot do for the student. The teacher can only help with the former part, by telling the student statements, after which the student must consult his inner light.
Words are signs, and they are not the things themselves but they signify the things. These things that are signified by the signs are known as significates. The word ‘green’ is not the colour itself but causes the colour of green to enter our thoughts. The speaker in this case could have conveyed his message in 2 possible ways. One was to use signs, as he did with his oral statement. Another would be to bring us to this room and let us see for ourselves the solo green cabinet. Even ostension, when the speaker points at the cabinet, is itself a sign, since we might have thought his finger was what the speaker wanted to convey, or he was pointing at the room itself rather than the cabinet.
This view is contrary to the common view of the Knowledge Transfer Model, where knowledge is transferred from the teacher’s mind to the student’s through written or spoken words, that is, language. Augustine argues against this view because words are signs, and we can never learn anything by means of signs since if we did not already know the meaning of the words/signs, its appearance will also not teach it to us. For instance, if we did not know what ‘cabinet’ meant, just saying the three-syllable word will not explain it to us. Instead, we need first to know the thing, cabinet, and then learn that the object is named ‘cabinet.’ However, once we know the thing, the cabinet can now be shown by signs. We can then also learn other signs for cabinet, for instance ‘Kabinett’ in a different language (German). If however we have a person who knows no words, such as a baby, they are not about to learn what the thing is through words in whatever language. That learning needs to come from within, from their inner light.
How do we ever learn anything in the first place? Some things are self-exhibiting, such as when we observe the act of eating, imitate it and do the action. Some are first-hand knowledge when we observe for instance cabinets. Augustine’s contention is that we may learn things in many ways, but signs are not sufficient for learning. He writes: “We learn the meaning of a word – that is, the signification hidden in the sound – once the thing signified is itself known, rather than our perceiving it by means of such signification.” (p. 137, l. 155-158). He points out further objections to the knowledge transfer model, such as when there are discrepancies between the words and the thoughts of the teacher, for example when the teacher deliberately lies (‘we start class at 2pm’, when he intends to wait for latecomers and ends up starting at 2:10pm) , or makes a unintentional slip (‘you have 3 questions’ when in fact you have to do only 2).
Augustine attributes the actual learning to something from within us. Hence to him, the teacher might not even have to provide information but simply by asking questions, in the manner of Socrates with Meno’s slave, the slave can figure out for himself even complex truths such as geometrical propositions (Plato’s example, not Augustine’s), because it is within him. However, Augustine does not deny the usefulness of words. They “remind us to look for things.” (p. 137, l. 170)
Assessment
Is Augustine right? He makes a good point in highlighting that we need first to know the object before we learn its ‘sign’ or name. However, he is focused on nouns such as cabinet, while his theory is unable to handle words such as ‘because’ or ‘of’. Even if we consider only nouns, he may not be entirely right since we do have ideas of things which we only have learnt of through signs, such as black holes, which we know of only through explanations using words, or representations (that is, signs) of it.
My inner light also would find it hard to judge the truth of black holes. It is not entirely clear in his illumination theory how God is providing such an inner light, whether the link is a kind of beam of light or telephone wire between me and God, or is there God inside me. If there is always this inner light telling us truth, how can Augustine account for all the untruths out there, for instance, the current president actually won the elections but somehow the election was stolen from him? Why isn’t the inner light giving us this answer?
My evaluation of his theory is that indeed signs are not the origin of knowledge but comes after we learn of the object itself, while his illumination theory is more problematic since he must then account for why there are innocent mistakes and how the inner light works. Augustine admits of our free will, but innocent mistakes come not from my obtuse use of my will but when I am genuinely mistaken, for instance, we made a judgement, using our inner light (?), that technology will save us but instead it gave us climate change.
Reference: Augustine, Against the Academicians; The Teacher, trans. Peter King (Hackett, 1995)
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