Ockham’s Connectedness of Virtues

William of Ockham (d. 1347) posits that moral virtue is an ethically-charged habit caused by moral acts that inclines or disposes us to perform similar acts. It is a feedback loop of acts leading to habits leading to further acts which then further reinforces the habit. This is contrary to the Independence of Act-Opportunity Principle where even if we have the opportunity to have one virtue, say temperance, it does not mean we will have the opportunity for other virtues such as justice. The act-opportunities are independent of one another. Since habits come from doing an act, if we never have the chance to act justly, then according to this principle, we will not be able to develop the virtue of justice, since no opportunities to act justly will mean no acts of justice. No acts of justice mean we do not form the habit of being just, leading to not acquiring the virtue of being just.  

Ockham presents a framework of 5 degrees of virtue. In the 1st degree, one does a random virtuous deed. Almost everyone possesses this degree of virtue since we do occasionally do nice things, for instance, today one feels like giving some money to a beggar because one is in a good mood but should we have been in a bad mood, we might not have done so. In the 2nd degree, one does a virtuous deed in conformity with reason keeping in mind possible backlash or reward. In the 3rd degree, known also as the philosopher’s virtue, one does a virtuous deed because it is dictated by right reason, regardless of whether there is backlash or reward. So reason is the focus in the 3rd degree. The 4th degree is to act virtuously for the love of God. The 5th and highest degree is to act virtuously in actual defiance of the threat of severe punishment or consequences. An example of those exhibiting the 5th degree would be a martyr.

Ockham argues against the Independence of Act-Opportunity Principle: when one is virtuous for the sake of right reason, or the 3rd and 4th degree of virtue in his parlance, in one virtue, say temperance, one will also act virtuously in the new virtue when the opportunity arise because it is reason that drives one’s actions.

The principle is not philosophically plausible since a lack of any virtue will compromise the other virtues. For instance, a father who is kind but lazy might end up failing to cook for his children leading to their deaths, hence he is not virtuous in general, or does not exhibit excellence or arete. People who have no opportunity will then not be virtuous whatsoever, and this will mean almost no one will be virtuous at all, since their life experience will not allow them to encounter all opportunities to acquire the habits leading to virtue. Ockham is hence entitled to use the principle in such a contrary way to demonstrate that given the connectedness of virtues, how a virtuous person can still develop even if they have only limited opportunities, since their perfect virtue in one specific virtue will lead them to act virtuously in the other virtue when the opportunity arises. He has hence solved the problem how an excellent person can develop despite the lack of all opportunities.